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Agency Costs, Corporate Governance and the Nature of Controlling Shareholders: Evidence From French Listed Firms

Author name : Moez Younes Dabboussi
Publication Date : 2018-09-26
Journal Name : International Journal of Accounting and Financial Reporting

Abstract

This paper examines the impact of internal corporate governance on agency costs for French firms from 2000 to 2015. Our results reveal that shareholders themselves are not a homogenous group since they have no single common investment horizon. We found that managerial ownership is more effective in mitigating operational expenses. However, they take advantage of excessive spending on indirect benefits. We show that board of directors does not serve as a significant deterrent to excessive discretionary expenses. Finally, we found that dividend policy is a useful tool to reduce agency conflicts by reducing cash that is available for discretionary uses.

Keywords

Agency costs, Corporate governance, Controlling shareholders, French listed firms

Publication Link

https://doi.org/10.5296/ijafr.v8i3.13621

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